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This article examines the congressional allocation of federal grant funds. Reflecting the
decision processes and norms of Congress, federal grant funds are allocated almost
completely on the basis of population (or equal share). None of the other factors used to
allocate specific federal funds (e.g., income, poverty, unemployment) have a great deal of
impact. As a result, most congressional battles are at the margin with only marginal
impact on the overall distribution.
Federal grants to state and local governments have been an
essential element of federalism for over a century (see Elazar,
1962; White, 1953; Wright, 1968; 1978).1 As federal aid grew to
one-fifth of state and local government expenditures, three major
controversies developed: (1) a reduced connection between
raising tax money and spending it, (2) increased friction concern-
ing the federal influence on the use of grant monies, and (3)
increased political conflict over grant formulas used to allocate
funds to state and local jurisdictions. This article addresses the
last controversy. Despite the frequent conflict over the nuances of
the allocational formulas, the norms of Congress operate to give
states relatively equal (when compared to population) shares of
federal money.
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4PATTERNS OF CONGRESSIONAL DECISION MAKING
Federal grants are examples of particularized benefits, that is,
benefits aimed at particular or specific recipients and that are
delivered in such a way as to permit members of Congress to take
credit for the delivery (Mayhew, 1974: 54). As such, federal grant
programs are characterized by universalistic politics (Shepsle and
Weingast, 1981 ) in a manner similar to a variety of distributive
policies (Ferejohn, 1974; Rundquist, 1973; Arnold, 1979). Two
congressional norms relative to universalistic politics apply to
federal grants and enable members of Congress to claim an equal
share of grant funds. The norms of building large and fluid
coalitions and of program expansion work to insure that each
member has something to take back to the constituents.
Congressional coalitions tend to be large-there is no limit on
the number of winners (Mayhew, 1974: 113). Coalitions that lead
to the creation or extension of federal grant programs are large
because grants have historically been allocated on a positive sum
basis whereby the size of the appropriation is increased to satisfy
member demands (e.g., the 1972 revenue-sharing debate). In
addition, coalitions are large because uncertainty in the legislative
process encourages building greater-than-minimum winning co-
alitions (see Dahl and Lindblom, 1953: chapter 12; Barry, 1965:
317-318). Those who are part of the coalition are likely to be
satisfied with the grant program-particularly how it treats their
district. If they are not satisfied with a specific grant program,
they may support it regardless because they know that under the
logrolling norm their district will eventually benefit from another
program (Kingdon, 1981: 100).
Coalitions in Congress also tend to be fluid; losers on one issue
become winners on the next.2 In fact, they may receive some
special consideration to compensate for the previous mistreat-
ment (Ray, 1980: 367-368). Congress has a participation norm
that holds that all members are entitled to participate in the
legislative process and, in turn, to acquire particularized benefits
for their constituents. Neither individuals nor classes of individuals
(e.g., based on party) are excluded from the process and payoffs
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5from the federal pork barrel. In fact, it is expected that Congress,
as an institution, and that members, individually, should facilitate
member activities aimed at serving constituents.
Program expansion, in both dollars and eligibility, has been an
additional norm applicable to the grant process. Examples
abound: the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA)
programs grew from helping the &dquo;poorest&dquo; to reaching 80% of the
nation’s school districts (Stockman, 1975: 23); or the Economic
Development Administration aid designed for disasters and
conversion of obsolete industries expanded to 84.5% of the
nation’s counties (Etzioni, 1981). Program expansion, of course,
means more members have more benefits to carry back to their
constituents. It also solidifies support for programs because it
brings more members into the coalition. (The ESEA, to continue
the above example, was originally enacted in 1965 over nearly 3:1 1
Republican opposition but was reauthorized in 1974 with only 15
opposition votes.)
The congressional norms that lead to large, fluid coalitions and
program expansion reflect a concern that no member be perma-
nently shut out of the legislative process. Since independently
elected members of Congress are of relatively equal status, since
the norms of Congress encourage participation in the coalition,
and since members have information before they vote on how
formulas will distribute grants, the fight over grant monies should
be relatively equal. An equal fight should result in a relatively
equal outcome so that the overall distribution of federal grants
should be closely tied to population. Where this is not possible
(e.g., rural electrification loans), logrolling will be used to add
coalition members in return for support on other narrowly based
programs.3 
FINDINGS
Our hypothesis is that a state’s total federal grant funds are
strongly related to the state’s population. In order to test this
hypothesis, the amount of federal grant money received by each
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6TABLE 1
Relationship Between Federal Aid to States (1978) and Population (1970)
state was regressed on that state’s population and several other
factors that are generally included in formulas to alter them from
a strict per capita distribution.4 Total federal grant dollars were
used rather than dollars per capita, because Congress does not
make decisions on total dollar amounts by using per capita
figures.5 To determine whether population is strongly related to
the federal grants allocation, we will require the r2 between
population and money to be high (.9+), the percentage slope (see
below) to be close to 1.0, that no other variable be able to explain
a significant proportion of the remaining variation, and the
standard error of the estimate to be fairly small 6
Table I reveals that population is strongly related to the
distribution of federal grants. When total federal grants to state
and local governments within each state (for 1978) are correlated
with the 1970 population, we find an r2 of .95. In other words,
only 5% of the state-to-state variation in federal funds cannot be
explained by population. Although the standard error ($506
million) may seem fairly large, it is a substantial reduction from
the standard deviation ($2,142 million). To determine if the
allocation of funds among the states was relatively equal, we
regressed each state’s percentage of the total grant pie on its
percentage of the nation’s population. If the slope for this
equation is close to 1.0, it indicates that the proportional shares
are relatively equal. Table I reveals a slope of 1.08; state shares,
therefore, are relatively equal.
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7Finally, when a variety of variables that reflect either items in
grant formulas or political variables were included in the analysis
(results not shown), they had virtually no impact on the
allocation. Only a state’s tax effort (Halstead, 1978), when
combined with the state’s population, had any substantively
significant8 effect on the distribution of federal monies. Tax effort
explained an additional 3% of the variation in federal aid; no
other factor explained as much as 1 %.
Although our hypothesis was confirmed, this does not mean
our theoretical reasoning is correct. In order to shed more light on
the general analysis of congressional decisionmaking in regard to
grants, we will derive a series of propositions that flow from that
reasoning to test for further confirmation of our theory.9
DISAGGREGATING FEDERAL AID
Aggregated federal aid may mask considerable variation
across various categories of federal aid or across specific pro-
grams. By disaggregating in various ways, new insights can be
brought to our understanding of grant allocations. The distribu-
tion of aid by functional category, grant type, and specific
program will be examined.
If grant allocation decisions are made with the intention of
insuring comparable per capita shares, population should be
strongly correlated with total dollars of aid for the nine major
categories of federal aid-public assistance, Medicaid, revenue
sharing, transportation, education, environmental protection,
public housing, community development block grants, and
CETA. Table 2 reveals that population is a major explanatory
factor in each area. Even the weakest correlation, between
population and educational grants, accounts for over three-
fourths of the variation in aid. The highest r2, for both CETA and
revenue sharing, reaches .97.10 The percentage slopes, while
exhibiting some variation, continue to hover around 1.0. In no
case can per capita income, percent of families in poverty, tax
effort, unemployment rates, urbanization, or age of the housing
stock explain as much variation as population. In fact, none of
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8TABLE 2
Relationship Between Federal Aid to States (1978)
and Population (1970) by Category of Aid
these variables adds more than 6% of explained variance to the
population figure. In addition, the standard errors remain
relatively modest.
Within the nine functional categories, however, there is
considerable variation in the types of programs and in the ability
of Congress to predetermine the distribution of funds. One of the
primary motivations behind the expansion of project grants is
that they limit political control and facilitate greater &dquo;autonomy
and discretion of program professionals&dquo; (Wright, 1978: 55). This
view suggests that there is a major distinction between formula
grants and project grants in the ability of Congress to specify
where funds will be spent. 12 Formula grants provide no administra-
tive discretion in the distribution of monies because agencies
simply plug the relevant numbers into a congressionally deter-
mined formula and allocate funds accordingly. Project grants,
however, provide administrative agencies more flexibility in
distributing funds. Although Congress maintains considerable
control over the allocation of project grants, administrative
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9TABLE 3
Relationship Between Formula-Based Federal Aid and Project-Based
Federal Aid (1978) with Population (1970)
agencies actually award the grants and can have an impact on
their distribution. Money distributed through formula grants,
then, should carry more obviously the mark of congressional
decisions. Since the mark of congressional decisions is distribu-
tion by population, money distributed under formula grants
should correlate more highly with population than does project
grant money.
Arnold (1979), though, suggests that the autonomy of project
grants is not as great as it might seem, and that in the allocation of
nearly all grant funds there is considerable interaction between
the administrative agency and Congress. If this view is correct,
then the ability of Congress to put its mark on project grants
would be nearly as great as for formula grants. That finding
would also suggest, as Fiorina (1977) has, that the Washington
establishment, as a whole, functions very well in serving the needs
of the membership of Congress.
To consider this issue, the two types of aid were separated and
regressed on population in Table 3. In general, both types of aid
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are closely tied to population reflecting the ability of Congress to
influence the distribution of all grant money; the difference
between formula aid (r2 = .94; slope = 1.09) and project aid (r2 =.91;
slope = 1.04) is not substantively or statistically (t = .88) signifi-
cant. Congressional controls via legislation and oversight obvi-
ously have some influence on project grant distributions. If the
congressional institution serves the needs of its members, so, too,
do the bureaucratic institutions.
Program Level Analysis
The above results all related population to some aggregation of
federal aid programs. Two components of congressional decision-
making can explain those very high correlations. First, for any
particular program Congress may try to distribute federal outlays
on an equal share basis. Second, Congress may engage in logroll-
ing, that is, members trade votes on particular issues so that in
the long run inequalities are cancelled out. Either pattern of
behavior alone could explain the correlations found to this point.
On the one hand, if every program distributed funds on a per
capita basis, the aggregation of these programs would yield high
correlations between population and aid. On the other hand, if
logrolling is used to trade programs that treat districts unequally,
the inequalities could be eliminated when the funds are aggre-
gated, thus resulting in high correlations.
To sort out the specific behaviors that are occurring, program
level data must be examined. If only the first behavior (decision-
making on each issue so that everyone gets a similar share) is
present, then we would expect uniformly high correlations
between outlays for specific programs and population. These
correlations would be consistent from program to program anc
would approach unity (as did our correlations presented above).
If only logrolling is occurring, the correlations at the program
level would be uniformly and substantially lower than those seen
to this point. Members would sponsor programs designed to aid
their constituents, and other members would support that legisla-
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TABLE 4
Correlations of Program Dollars with State Population, by Program Type
(1978)
a Contams some project elements
b. Contains some direct payments
c. Contains some loan elements
tion based on the expectation that the favor will be reciprocated
when they offer legislation advantageous to their constituents. If
both behaviors are present, correlations at the program level will
vary.
Table 4 presents the correlations between state population and
federal funds received for 49 federal programs.13 The projects are
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grouped according to four major types of intergovernmental
transfers-formula grants, project grants, direct payments, and
loans. Although our focus is on grants (formula and project), we
have included direct payments and loans as a basis for comparison.
The correlations in Table 4 support the conclusion that Congress
both equalizes and logrolls. For all programs, the range of r2 is
from .01 (for rural electric loans) to seven programs with an r2 >
.95. In the formula grant category the range is from .97 (for social
service, low income) to .39 for impact aid. The average formula
coefficient is .81.14 Project grants show more variation. The
strongest corrrelation is for community action grants (r2 = .95),
while the lowest is for low-income housing (r2 =. 12). The average
coefficient for project grants is .50. Direct payments tend to have
high correlations as we would expect, because these programs
provide aid directly to individuals. Loans and other programs
show no clear pattern of correlation although the correlations are
generally low. This pattern of correlation is consistent with the
hypothesis that generally Congress tries to equalize aid for
specific programs but that it also engages in logrolling. The
results of these congressional attempts, as our earlier correlations
also indicate, are remarkably successful in providing an equalized
distribution of grant monies.
Congress Is Getting Better At It
The nature of the relationship between grant money and
population is likely to change along with changes in the importance
of grant programs and with changes in Congress. Essentially,
several reasons suggest that the distribution of grant money
according to population has become more equitable than before.
The number of dollars distributed through intergovernmental
grants has increased from $2.3 billion in 1950 to $77.9 billion in
1978. One consequence of this phenomenon is that watching
where dollars are headed has become more important for
members. Members of Congress realize that even marginal
changes have considerable impact on how much money their
district will receive. The need for vigilance is greater. At the same
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time, there is some evidence that current members are more
concerned with constituency service and pork barrel activities
than were their predecessors (Fiorina, 1977).
Changes within Congress have also improved the ability of
members to obtain reasonable funding for their districts. The first
change is the decentralization of the body-the growth of sub-
committee government. Fiorina (1977: 62-67) suggests that this
decentralization is conducive to logrolling. A more significant
development is the growth of congressional staff. Members have
enough staff to follow more legislation than they were able to in
the past. Today, members not on the relevant subcommittee are
more likely to play a role in formula deliberations than were their
predecessors. Few members of the 97th Congress did not have
access to information on how the various revenue-sharing for-
mula options affected his or her district. The larger congressional
staffs have increased the number of participants who can bargain
over the distribution of funds. More informed participants
should result in everyone receiving a fair share.
The computer has also changed the way the bargaining takes
place. The use of data processing equipment means that formula
after formula can be tried and that every member of Congress can
see the results of those trials. An official of the Congressional
Budget Office describes the effect of the computer: &dquo;Now every
side has the new weapon. The level of information is very high and
the result is a more even battle&dquo; (Stanfield, 1978; 1977). And an
even battle leads to a draw-everyone gets an equal share of the
spoils.
The preceding analysis suggests that the relationship between
population and government aid should be stronger now than in
the past. Specifically, we expect that the correlation between the
two will increase over time. Moreover, the equity of the distribu-
tion should become more obvious: the absolute deviation of the
percentaged slope from 1.0 should decrease. Table 5 indicates
that both of those expectations are fulfilled. The r2 for 1952 was
&dquo;only&dquo; .76; ten years later it was .80; in 1972 it was .91; and the r2
for 1978 was .95. The slopes also moved closer to 1.0. The devia-
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TABLE 5
Relationship Between Population and Federal Aid for 1952,1962,1972,
1978
tion in 1952 was .24; in 1962 it had shrunk to .12; in 1972 it was
.10; and in 1978 the deviation was down to .08. The trend is clear:
over the last 25 years the distribution of grant money to state and
local government has approached a relatively equal per capita
share allocation.
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CONCLUSION
Before summarizing our findings, we should specify two con-
clusions that we did not reach. First, we are not arguing that grant
allocations do not vary from population, nor that the per capita
differences that are present are trivial. Second, we are not arguing
that political factors such as position and influence in Congress
are unimportant.
At both the program level and when aggregated, some districts
are marginally advantaged or disadvantaged. The 5% of the total
variation that population does not explain is still a large amount
of money. Table 6 shows the amount of money each state received
in 1978, the amount it would have received if monies were
allocated based on population alone, the amount gained-lost by
using the present allocational plans, and that amount as a
percentage of the population-based figure. With the strong
correlation between population and grant monies, we should not
expect the residuals to be very large and, in fact, they are not.
There are, however, some relatively big winners and losers in the
process. In terms of dollars, the biggest winner is New York,
which received about $2.5 billion more than a strict per capitation.
Their total allocation, rather than being just over $8 billion,
topped $10 billion. California, the only other state to receive $10
billion, was the second most overrewarded state ($1.2 billion).
Massachusetts ($1 billion) was the only other state to receive at
least $500 million more than its population-based share. The only
states to fall short of their population-based share by that amount
were Ohio ($1.1 billion), Texas ($900 milliion), Indiana ($800
million), and Pennsylvania ($600 million).
Another way to consider how much states win or lose is to
standardize according to their expected allocation. The final
column in Table 6 shows that the biggest percentage winners were
Alaska, Hawaii, and Wyoming. Massachusetts, New Mexico,
Nevada, Oregon, New York, Vermont, and Montana were the
only other states to receive a bonus of at least 20% over their
expected allocation. The states that fell at least 20% short were
Indiana, Kansas, Iowa, Nebraska, and Ohio.
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TABLE 6
Winners and Losers In the Formula Game (in millions $)
To recapitulate, while the correlation between federal grants to
state and local governments and population is quite strong,
variation exists beyond that accounted for by population.
Furthermore, the nonpopulation-related 5% constitutes a sizable
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sum of money; it is well worth fighting over. 15 In fact, finding
adequate explanation for variations from strictly per capita
allocations should continue to be a high priority for future
research.
The second point to highlight is that we believe political factors
are important in the distribution of federal grants; they can help
account for the variation that population cannot explain (see
Ferejohn, 1974; Murphy, 1974; Strom, 1975). Grant programs
are replete with examples of single members gaining concessions
to help their district or similar districts. For example, that
Louisiana sheriffs would receive federal revenue sharing funds if
the (former) Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee hap-
pened to represent any other state is hard to imagine. Former
Senator Fulbright was successful in expanding the Economic
Development Act to include more aid for areas with rural
underemployment, thereby providing considerable assistance to
his own state of Arkansas (Davidson, 1966).16
We did find, however, that the distribution of federal grant
money to state and local governments closely relates to the popu-
lation of the area. This result is consistent with the behavior and
norms of Congress. First, it is the norm not to exclude any
member or set of members from sharing the goods that Congress
allocates; in fact, the norm is that everyone should receive a
reasonable share whenever practical. The other norm is operative
whenever it is not practical to distribute funds evenly. In that
situation, grants that provide disproportional benefits to one type
of district are balanced by programs designed for other districts.
Our findings cannot be attributed to an aggregation effect
whereby state totals create an artificial correlation between popu-
lation and federal grants. The data were disaggregated, yet the
strong relationships remained. 17 First, when the grant programs
were divided into nine functional areas, the correlation between
grant dollars and population in each area remained high (r2 =.76 -
.97). Second, when grant monies were disaggregated into nine
project grants and seventeen formula grants, the correlation
between population and dollars dropped but remained fairly
large. Attributing the results solely to the effect of aggregation,
therefore, is inconsistent with the data.
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The finding that federal grant monies are equitably based on
population is hardly trivial. Three reasons indicate the substan-
tive importance of this finding. First, Congress spends a great
deal of time debating formula elements, and changes in formula
elements have only a marginal impact on the distribution of
federal funds. Large changes would result ony if the population-
funds relationship is addressed. Second, as tools of analysis have
improved, so has the ability of Congress to allocate grant funds
more equitably. The proportion of grant funds attributable to
population increased from 76% in 1952 to 95% in 1978. If Con-
gress considered the linkage trivial, the strength of the relationship
would not increase. Third, the use of population to determine the
allocation of funds is consistent with past studies of congressional
decision-making. Key variables, such as large, fluid coalitions,
focus on constituency benefits, and program expansion explains
why the population-funding relationship exists.
NOTES
1. This article examines federal grants funds, not total federal aid or total federal
expenditures. Only in Table 4 are any nongrant data presened, and then only for compari-
son purposes.
2. Very few members perpetually lose in Congress. An examination of Congres-
sional Quarterly’s key votes for 1974 and 1975 indicates that in only ten instances (in both
the House and the Senate) did members fail to be on the winning side on at least one-fourth
of their votes. Conversely, the normal pattern is for two-thirds of the members to be in the
majority on two-thirds or better of the votes.
3. The hypothesis that members receive relatively equal allocations for their districts
has been stated more colorfully by others. Samuel H. Beer ( 1976: 149) calls this "one man,
one vote, one dollar." Roger H. Davidson (1966: 27) supplied our title with his quote of
former Senator Paul Douglas who described this pattern as "pass the biscuits, Pappy."
Davidson’s description of the coalition-building process in Congress greatly influenced
our thinking on how Congress enacts grant legislation and can serve to illustrate
graphically a number of our points throughout.
4. The source for federal grant and expenditure data is the appendix of Anton et al.
(1980). They provide the cleanest data available as well as a lucid discussion of the
components of federal outlays to state and local governments. The data for per capita
income, families in poverty, unemployment, urbanization, and age of housing stock are
taken from the U. S. census. We use 1970 data for our demographic data because those are
the figures that Congress used in its decisions; using 1977 demographic data in no way
changes the conclusions of this study.
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5. We use total grant dollars, rather than per capita dollars, because our hypothesis
suggests that dollar totals are strongly related to population. We wish to identify how
strongly the two are related and, equally important, to shed light on the model of
congressional decision-making that, we have hypothesized, dominates these allocations. It
is our intention, therefore, to account for the bulk of the distribution of funds. Since our
model states that the acquisition of relatively equal shares of money is of specific and
primary concern to members of Congress, the operationalization of the test of that model
is, we believe, consistent with the views of both Uslander (1976) and Lyons (1977). We
believe there is also reason to consider the 5% of the variation that we cannot explain with
our model (and call for such analysis below), but that is not the goal here.
6. These four tests might fail to convince the skeptic because there are no hard-and-
fast rules about when a relationship is termed "strong." If population is not the major
factor in allocating federal grants, then the results of this article would not be as consistent
as they are. No other logical determinant has been found.
7. This approach was suggested by Robert S. Erikson. The coefficients of determina-
tion are the same for both equations because the second regression used variables that are
linear transformations of the first. The fit for the second equation, therefore, is fairly high.
This approach is consistent with Ward’s (1981) emphasis on use of slopes to assess policy
equity.
8. The concept "substantive significance" is used here because statistical significance
has little meaning when a population is analyzed. In general, we define any explanation of
less than 1% as lacking in substantive significance.
9. Although this article focuses on total dollar figures rather than per capita figures,
the explanation of per capita figures merits some discussion. Four variables were
significantly related to per capita federal aid. These variables and their regression
coefficients are percentage of pre-1950s housing (-8.86), tax effort (4.62), percentage of
urbanization (-4.05) and percentage of population below poverty (-11.51). The four
variables explain 52% of the variation. Using per capita figures, however, controls for
population size and eliminates most of the variation.
10. The very high correlation for revenue sharing is the result of some very interesting
compromises. The first was between those who represented wealthy districts (generally
Republicans) who wanted to reward tax efforts, and those from poorer districts (generally
Democrats) who wanted to redistribute wealth. The formula ultimately included both
factors, which essentially cancelled each other out. The other major compromise was
between the House and the Senate. The House formula rewarded urban, populous areas,
while the Senate formula rewarded rural areas. In a unique compromise, the conference
committee kept both formulas and let each state choose the formula that provided them
the most funds. See Beer (1976: 127-196) on the first point, and the 1972 Congressional
Quarterly Almanac, pp. 636-652, on the second point.
11. Tax effort explains 6% of the variation in Medicaid and public assistance levels.
No other variables even approach this level of explanation.
12. Here, again, we follow Anton et al. (Moving Money) who identify five categories
of federal domestic expenditures. These two are the ones relevant to our analysis of federal
transfers to state and local governmental units.
13. Again, these data are from Anton et al. (1980).
14. These averages are different from the correlations presented in Table 3 because
these average the correlations for each program without weighting them for the size of the
program.
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15. An interesting question is what explains the residual variation in Table 6. Four
variables are significantly related to the residual variation-tax effort, population,
number of unemployed, and proportion of persons living in poverty. Together these
variables explain 62% of the residual variation. Collineanty however, is a major problem
in this regression, resulting in slope coefficients that are difficult to interpret.
16. One indication that political factors play a role m allocating grants is that the
residual variation in Table 6 is correlated with residual of total federal expenditures (r =
.47). If political skills procure a greater-than-equal share of grants, they should also
procure a greater-than-equal share of all federal expenditures. A second indication is that
the residual variation in grant allocations is not related over time. Since political factors
are unlikely to be related over time, that finding is consistent with the notion of political
influence.
17. Grant allocations to the nation’s 70 largest cities were also analyzed with the
results being virtually identical to the state-level findings.
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